Foreign exchange market intervention in emerging markets: motives, techniques and implications by Peter Pang & Bank for International Settlements
162  BIS Papers No 24
 
Foreign exchange market operations: 




This note reviews the experience of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA)’s foreign exchange 
market operations under the currency board arrangement since September 2003. During this period, 
the Hong Kong dollar (HK$) exchange rate against the US dollar (US$) experienced some unusual 
movements relative to the pattern in recent years. After staying very close to the level of HK$ 7.8 per 
US dollar for a number of years, in late September 2003 the Hong Kong dollar appreciated against the 
US dollar. The exchange rate at one point reached HK$ 7.7050 per US dollar, about 10 basis points 
(or 1.23%) away from 7.8. To stabilise the exchange rate, the HKMA purchased US dollars against 
Hong Kong dollars from banks, which resulted in a sizeable increase in interbank liquidity and led 
interbank interest rates to fall below US dollar interest rates. During the spring of 2004, the Hong Kong 
dollar exchange rate weakened gradually and reached the 7.8 level at which the HKMA stands ready 
to sell US dollars for Hong Kong dollars in response to requests from banks. More recently, since early 
October 2004, there has been renewed appreciating pressure on the Hong Kong dollar.  
The recent episode of appreciation pressures on the Hong Kong dollar raises some interesting issues. 
What are the main factors that have contributed to the strong inflows of funds into the Hong Kong 
dollar? How has the HKMA conducted market operations to stabilise the exchange rate under the 
currency board arrangement? What are the implications of these operations on domestic monetary 
conditions and therefore the wider economy? To address these questions, the next section provides a 
brief description of the currency board arrangement in Hong Kong. Section  2 summarises recent 
market developments and considers factors that may have contributed to the upward pressures on the 
Hong Kong dollar, including a weakening of US dollar against other major currencies, market 
speculation about a revaluation of the renminbi, and improvements in economic conditions in 
Hong Kong. Section 3 outlines some policy considerations, including the HKMA’s strategy for market 
operations, and implications for monetary and financial conditions in Hong Kong. Section 4 concludes. 
1.  Hong Kong’s currency board arrangement  
The monetary policy framework in Hong Kong is that of a currency board, under which the Hong Kong 
dollar is linked to the US dollar at a rate of 7.8 (hence the Linked Exchange Rate System). Under this 
system, the HKMA seeks to stabilise the Hong Kong dollar/US dollar exchange rate by buying and 
selling Hong Kong dollars on bank offers in the face of capital outflows and inflows. Foreign exchange 
market operations by the HKMA lead to changes in banks’ clearing balances held with the HKMA (the 
aggregate balance). As a result of changes in the interbank liquidity, which is a key element of the 
monetary base, interbank interest rates will move in the direction that is conducive for a reversal of 
fund flows. The interest rate arbitrage activity is a key part of the automatic adjustment process that 
maintains exchange rate stability.  
Currency board principles require that changes in the monetary base can only be brought about by 
corresponding changes in foreign exchange reserves. Thus, operations by the currency board in the 
foreign exchange market can have immediate impact on domestic monetary conditions, and no 
sterilisation is allowed. Under normal conditions, interest rates in Hong Kong would follow closely 
those in the US, due to interest rate arbitrage activity. However, when there are strong inflows or 
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outflows of funds, Hong Kong dollar interest rates can deviate substantially from their US  dollar 
counterparts.  
As to the exact level of the exchange rate at which the HKMA is committed to buy and sell Hong Kong 
dollars, the current system involves an asymmetric arrangement. Specifically, the HKMA undertakes to 
convert banks’ Hong Kong dollar clearing balances to US dollars at the rate HK$ 7.8/US$ when there 
are pressures on the weak side.
2 When this so-called “convertibility undertaking” (CU) is triggered, the 
Aggregate Balance will contract, leading to an increase in domestic interest rates. By contrast, the 
HKMA does not announce an explicit exchange rate at which it will stand ready to convert US dollars  
to Hong Kong dollars, although it is clear that it will undertake HKD sales if the exchange rate 
strengthens materially from 7.8. The absence of such a “strong-side” undertaking implies that the 
HKMA can determine at which level and under what circumstances it will accept offers from banks to 
purchase US dollars. This gives the HKMA some very limited technical discretion. It is noted that the 
absence of an explicit CU on the “strong side” is well-known among market participants and has been 
discussed publicly on a number of occasions by the HKMA.
3 The rationale of this arrangement is set 
out in Section 3. 
The HKMA tries to keep its market operations as simple and easily understandable as possible. The 
HKMA conducts its foreign exchange operations only in the spot Hong Kong dollar market across 
different time zones, and as noted above, all currency board transactions are unsterilised. The HKMA 
has been disclosing the records of discussion of the Exchange Fund Advisory Committee’s (EFAC’s) 
subcommittee on currency board operations since November 1998 to promote public understanding of 
its market operations.
4 Immediately after the completion of market operations, the HKMA releases real 
time data on its net injection or withdrawal of funds in the interbank market and the corresponding 
forecast changes in the aggregate balance via Reuters contribution page. This measure enables 
market participants to anticipate changes in interbank liquidity and facilitates a more efficient 
adjustment in interbank interest rates. Moreover, detailed information on the monetary base and 
interbank liquidity are released daily on the HKMA website and its Reuters page. 
2.  Recent market developments and HKMA’s operations 
In late September 2003, the Hong Kong dollar appreciated against the US dollar, and reached an 
intraday high of HK$ 7.705 to the US$ in early October 2003. This marked a deviation from the usual 
trading range of 7.797 and 7.8. Under the currency board arrangements, the HKMA carried out 
104 strong-side operations, at which it sold Hong Kong dollars for US dollars, between 23 September 
2003 and 10 February 2004. A total of HK$ 54.17 billion was sold by the HKMA during this period. 
Chart 1 shows the Hong Kong dollar spot exchange rate during this period together with the HKMA’s 
strong-side operations, as well as the operations conducted as a consequence of the exchange rate 
reaching the CU. It shows that the level of the exchange rate at which strong-side operations take 
place vary over time. For instance, while such operations in 2002 were conducted at levels above 
7.79, during the episode under consideration they typically took place between 7.75 and 7.77. Since 
October 2004, strong-side operations have typically been conducted at levels above 7.75. It is noted 
that under normal market conditions, strong-side operations are conducted in a passive manner. 
However, when there are strong inflows or when the exchange rate strengthens sharply, a more 
proactive approach is desirable (see below). 
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In accordance with currency board principles, the sales of Hong Kong dollars by the HKMA were 
matched by corresponding increases in the aggregate balance, which rose to an unprecedented level 
of HK$ 54.54 billion on 18
 March 2004. Chart 2 plots the daily aggregate balance, with the period from 
late September 2003 to early February 2004 highlighted. In the 12 months preceding this episode, the 
average level of the aggregate balance was HK$ 370 million. Thus, interbank liquidity rose much 
beyond what banks previously had required for interbank payment purposes. 
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With ample liquidity in place, Hong Kong dollar interest interest rates fell, especially at the shorter end 
of the yield curve. In particular, the overnight HIBOR declined quickly to near-zero levels between late 
September and early October 2003, and remained at those levels until late August 2004. Chart 3 
shows the level of the 3-month Hong Kong dollar and US dollar interest rates, with the same period 
highlighted as in Chart 2. While the US dollar rate was stable at a level somewhat above one percent, 
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Chart 3 
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During the spring of 2004, signs of capital outflows appeared and the Hong Kong dollar depreciated 
towards the 7.8 level. Between late April and the end of September 2004, the CU was triggered 
repeatedly, causing the HKMA to purchase some HK$ 51.45 billion from the market. Interbank interest 
rates rose along with the US interest rates, reflecting the monetary tightening by the US Federal 
Reserve. However, there was renewed appreciation pressure on the Hong Kong dollar exchange rate 
in October 2004, prompting the HKMA to conduct a number of strong-side operations by selling 
HK$ 10.9 billion to the market, leading to matched increases in the aggregate balance. As a result, 
Hong Kong dollar interbank interest rates fell to near-zero levels again, increasing the negative 
spreads against US rates.  
Both external and domestic factors may have played a role in the strengthening of the Hong Kong 
dollar exchange rate in this episode. These include a weaker US dollar, speculative pressures for an 
appreciation of the renminbi and improved economic conditions in Hong Kong. In addition, market 
dynamics including an unwinding of Hong Kong dollar short positions is likely to have played a role as 
well.  
Weakened sentiment towards the US dollar 
The strong inflows of funds took place against the background of market concerns about the 
sustainability of the current account deficit in the US and a weak US dollar. Moreover, the US 
administration had been calling for more exchange rate flexibility, especially on the part of its major 
trading partners in Asia. The G7 communiqué issued on 20 September 2003 reiterated this position, 
leading to market expectations of a depreciation of the US dollar against Asian currencies. Chart 4 
illustrates that most of the Asian currencies that floated, particularly the yen, appreciated against the 
US dollar in this period. 166  BIS Papers No 24
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The G-7 statement led to renewed speculation that the renminbi would be revalued and the discount of 
the renminbi in the non-deliverable forward (NDF) market widened markedly. Chart  5 shows the 
renminbi /US dollar NDF rate and the size of the HKMA’s foreign exchange operations. Positive values 
denote the amount of Hong Kong dollars sold by the HKMA for US dollars on the strong side and 
negative values denote the amount of Hong Kong dollars purchased by the HKMA as a consequence 
of the exchange rate reaching the 7.8 limit. Chart  6 provides a similar comparison between the 
Japanese yen/US dollar spot exchange rate and the HKMA’s market operations. These two charts 
indicate that strong-side operations, which were prompted by inflows of funds, were associated with a 
sharp widening of the 12-month renminbi NDF points as well as the weakening of the US dollar 
against the yen. The subsequent triggering of the CU due to outflows took place when the yen 
exchange rate and renminbi forward points reversed markedly.  
There are a number of explanations for why the weaker US dollar and upward pressures on the 
renminbi led to inflows of funds into Hong Kong. First, the weaker US dollar, to which the Hong Kong 
dollar is linked, implies a depreciation of the Hong Kong dollar against other major currencies including 
floating Asian currencies. This improves Hong Kong’s external competitiveness and thus the economic 
outlook, which in turn increases the potential return on Hong Kong assets. Because the renminbi is 
also pegged to the US dollar, Hong Kong could also benefit from an increased intermediation of 
exports originating from Mainland China. Second, the speculative pressures on the renminbi attract 
inflows into Hong Kong dollars, because some Hong Kong dollar denominated assets, including H and 
red-chip shares listed in Hong Kong, would benefit from a higher valuation should the renminbi 
appreciate. Furthermore, some market participants perceive a link between the Hong Kong dollar and 
the renminbi given the increasing economic integration between the two economies and the stable 
exchange rate between the two currencies in the past decade. Thus, they expect that a change in the 
renminbi exchange rate regime will also lead to a change in the Hong Kong dollar exchange rate 
system (even though this is ungrounded speculation).  BIS Papers No 24  167
 
Chart 5 
Renminbi non-deliverable forward points and market operations 
 
Chart 6 
The YEN/US$ exchange rate and market operations 
 
Improved economic conditions in Hong Kong 
The second factor was the marked improvement in economic conditions and in the growth outlook for 
Hong Kong. Several favourable developments appear to have played a role, in particular the 
strengthening of global economic conditions, the conclusion of a Closer Economic Partnership 
Agreement (CEPA) with the mainland, and the mainland’s relaxation of restrictions for mainland 
visitors travelling to Hong Kong. Along with the recovery in economic growth, the unemployment rate, 
which peaked in August 2003 at 8.7%, started declining and reached 6.9% in July 2004, and there, 
were signs that deflation was coming to an end. In particular, following a number of years of sharp 
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A recent study by Gerlach, Ho and Leung (2004) finds that pressures on the Hong Kong dollar were 
mainly determined by the yen/US dollar exchange rate and the 12-month renminbi NDF point, rather 
than domestic economic variables.
5 This suggests that external factors played a more important role in 
explaining the inflows of funds in this episode. Furthermore, there is a clear systematic component in 
HKMA’s strong-side operations. In particular, the likelihood of strong-side operations increases with 
the spreads of the Hong Kong dollar overnight interest rate over its US dollar counterpart, and 
decreases with the level of the aggregate balance and 12-month Hong Kong dollar forward rate. 
Market dynamics: an unwinding of Hong Kong dollar short positions and limited interest rate 
spreads  
In addition to the economic factors noted above, market dynamics have also likely played a role. The 
abrupt appreciation of the Hong Kong dollar at the beginning of the period considered led to an 
unwinding of Hong Kong dollar short positions, some of which had been entered into by market 
participants to hedge against the perceived risks of depreciation of the currency. This probably 
exacerbated the movements of the Hong Kong dollar. It is noted that banks’ net US dollar open 
position rose to about HK$ 94 billion by end-July 2003 from HK$ 60 billion two years ago, but declined 
in the episode of appreciating pressures to HK$ 46 billion by end-July 2004. 
More generally, the private sector of the Hong Kong economy has accumulated a large amount of net 
foreign assets, part of which reflects increased savings and limited investment opportunities in 
Hong Kong during the economic downturn. This is evidenced by the large current account surpluses in 
the past few years, which reached a high level of over 10% of GDP in 2003. Improved sentiments 
towards the Hong Kong dollar and its denominated assets have probably caused some repatriation of 
funds back to Hong Kong.  
Finally, interest rate arbitrage activity, which is a key element of the automatic adjustment mechanism 
under the currency board arrangement, has probably not functioned effectively, because of limited 
spreads between Hong Kong dollar and US dollar interest rates. This is because US interest rates 
were at low levels of about 1% pa until recently (still low relative to historical standards, despite the 
increases in the past few months), and Hong Kong dollar interest rates could not fall below zero. As a 
result, the strong-side operations could not lead to the development of an interest rate spread 
sufficiently large to induce outflows. 
3. Operation  strategy  and policy considerations 
The strength of the spot exchange rate relative to the linked rate of 7.8 has led some market 
participants to question the merits of not having an explicit CU on the strong side. It is argued that the 
HKMA could have maintained the spot exchange rate at a level close to 7.8 by committing to buy 
US dollars at that level on an unlimited basis. Such an explicit CU would help anchor exchange rate 
expectations, which should facilitate interest rate arbitrage activity. With expectations of zero change 
in the exchange rate, even a small interest rate differential should induce an outflow of funds.  
It is noted that policy issues concerning strong-side operations have been considered by the currency 
board subcommittee of the Exchange Fund Advisory Committee on a number of occasions in recent 
years. The subcommittee is fully aware of the potential benefits and costs of an explicit CU on the 
strong side. In particular, it is recognised that well-defined and narrow margins for movement in the 
market exchange rate would increase the predictability and transparency of the system, and thus 
conceptually would be more congruous with the currency board’s objective of providing a firm 
exchange rate anchor. However, a number of considerations point to potential costs of an explicit 
strong-side CU. The subcommittee considers that, on balance, the current arrangement is appropriate. 
The most important consideration is that the absence of an explicit CU makes it difficult for speculators 
to calculate the cost of shorting the Hong Kong dollar, as they do not know the precise rate at which 
Hong Kong dolllars could be bought back to square their positions. Thus, the possibility of a small 
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appreciation of the Hong Kong dollar helps reduce the downward speculative pressures. In this 
respect, it is noted that it is more difficult to defend a fixed exchange rate on the weak side than on the 
strong side. On the weak side, a monetary authority’s ability to purchase the domestic currency is 
limited by the size of foreign exchange reserves. The resulting high interest rates depress the 
economy, and could even threaten financial stability, reducing the political acceptance of maintaining 
the fixed exchange rate. On the strong side, the monetary authority could buy the US dollar on an 
unlimited basis by creating Hong Kong dollar liquidity. While the resulting zero interest rate may lead 
to overheating pressures in the economy, the impact is generally viewed to be more benign than that 
of high interest rates. Thus, the ambiguity on the strong side is “constructive” in that it helps to redress 
this asymmetry. By sacrificing a bit of transparency on the strong side, which is relatively easy to 
defend, it increases the resilience of the system to weak-side pressures, thereby improving the 
sustainability of the system as a whole. A recent IMF study presents a theoretical model showing that 
under certain circumstances some ambiguity on the strong side of the linked exchange rate is optimal, 
because it improves the credibility and resilience of the whole system.
6 
Next, by providing some scope for the exchange rate to strengthen in response to capital inflows, it 
helps absorb pressures and reduce, albeit on a limited basis, the impact on interbank interest rates 
and reserves. Moreover, an explicit CU with a tight bid-offer spread would not be conducive to the 
development of a liquid foreign exchange market. Instead of dealing with one another, banks would 
choose to transact with the HKMA when the bid-offer rates are hit. 
In the absence of an explicit CU on the strong side, the HKMA exercises discretion in choosing the 
precise level of exchange rate at which to sell Hong Kong dollars, taking into consideration the 
prevailing market conditions. In general, strong-side operations are passive in nature, in that the 
HKMA responds to bank offers of US dollars at market rates instead of placing out orders in the 
foreign exchange market. However, a more proactive approach is adopted on occasions when there 
are strong speculative inflows or when the exchange rate strengthens sharply. This is because banks 
taking a speculative long position in the Hong Kong dollar have a disincentive to sell US dollars to the 
HKMA, as the transaction would lead to an increase in interbank liquidity, followed by an easing of 
interest rates and the exchange rate. To the extent that they constitute a significant force in the 
market, the exchange rate may strengthen sharply, while banks remain reluctant to approach the 
HKMA. Under those circumstances, placing an order in the market would be more effective in capping 
the exchange rate movement, and ensuring that the interest rate adjustment mechanism kicks in when 
the exchange rate hits the “intervention” rate. 
As currency speculation would invariably be associated with rumours about the government’s resolve 
to maintain the link, the “intervention” rate should be set close to 7.8 to remove market uncertainties. 
This has indeed been the case, although the HKMA has not fixed an implicit target or tolerance level 
for strong-side operations. Looking forward, systematic operations by the HKMA on the strong side 
should help anchor the exchange rate. Interest rate arbitrage activity will also be helped by a widening 
of interest rate spreads, as the US Federal Reserve is generally expected to raise the federal funds 
target rate further.  
Finally, it is noted that currency board operations affect domestic monetary conditions to the extent 
they change interest rates, and that in the face of capital inflows, the impact would be capped because 
interest rates have a zero bound. Unlike most other systems, the aggregate balance can only be 
changed through foreign exchange transactions with the HKMA, and banks cannot withdraw balances 
with the HKMA to fund lending. In this episode, the impact of near zero interest rates on economic and 
financial conditions has not been a major concern. This is because the Hong Kong economy is still at 
an early phase of recovery. It has just emerged from a prolonged period of deflation, and the demand 
for credit remains subdued. Property prices have increased markedly, but this represents a rebound 
from a low level following sharp falls in earlier years.  
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4. Conclusions 
This paper reviews the recent experiences of the HKMA’s operations in the foreign exchange market. 
It considers factors underpinning the strong inflow of funds in the latter part of 2003 and the more 
recent period since October 2004. These include weakened sentiments towards the US dollar, 
speculations about a renminbi revaluation and an improved outlook for the Hong Kong economy. 
Furthermore, market dynamics has probably exacerbated the upward pressures on the Hong Kong 
dollar. Some investors had previously accumulated large Hong Kong dollar short positions that took 
some time to unwind. Interest rate arbitrage activity was probably limited by the small Hong Kong 
dollar/US dollar interest rate spreads. 
The note also outlines policy considerations in relation to the absence of an explicit CU on the strong 
side of the linked exchange rate. The current arrangement is considered optimal mainly because the 
constructive ambiguity on the strong side helps deter speculative pressures against the Hong Kong 
dollar on the weak side. In choosing the exact level of the exchange rate to sell the Hong Kong dollar, 
the HKMA has mainly responded to bank offers of the US dollar in a passive manner. Nevertheless, 
when there are strong speculative pressures or the exchange rate appreciates sharply, a proactive 
approach is adopted to counter possible strategic behaviour of large market players, and to provide an 
anchor for the exchange rate. 
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